COMMITTEE LANGUAGE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

F/A-18C/D (FIGHTER) HORNET
ACCOUNT: APN

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC

F/A-18E/F (FIGHTER) HORNET
ACCOUNT: APN

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
2,101,100	1,348,907	2,101,100	2,101,100	2,101,000	2,101,000	2,101,000

F/A-18E/F (FIGHTER) HORNET (AP-CY)
ACCOUNT: APN

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
90,475	90,475	90,475	90,475	90,475	90,475	*****66,475

***reflects the amount rescinded in the general provisions of Rpt. 105-265**

F-18 SERIES
ACCOUNT: APN

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
156,213	156,213	156,213	156,213	156,213	140,713	164,713

F/A-18 SQUADRONS
ACCOUNT: RDT&E

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
316,976	207,776	316,976	293,976	207,776	290,976	293,976

F/A-18A MODS
ACCOUNT: NGRE

PRESBUD	HNSC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
				58,000		

HNSC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-132)

(Page 62)
AN/AWW–13 guided weapon control monitor set

The budget request did not contain funding to procure AN/ AWW–13 guided weapon control monitor sets.

The AN/AWW–13 provides the data link capability for the F/A– 18 series aircraft to employ the precision-guided Walleye and Stand-off Land Attack Missiles (SLAM). The committee understands that the Navy requires 218 AN/AWW–13s, but only plans to procure 200 of these systems through calendar year 1997, when production of the AN/AWW–13 is scheduled for termination. To meet the Navy's requirement and retain AN/AWW–13 production capability for future F/A–18s or other aircraft that employ Walleye or SLAM, the committee recommends an increase of $9.0 million to procure the remaining 18 systems.

(Page 63-64)
F/A–18

The budget request contained $2,101.1 million for procurement of 20 F/A–18E/F aircraft, four fewer than the number for which advance procurement funds were requested in fiscal year 1997, and $90.5 million for advanced procurement of 30 aircraft in fiscal year 1999.

Based on the recently-released recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy's current procurement objective for the F/A–18E/F is 548 to 785 aircraft, at a maximum production rate of 48 aircraft per year, which has been decreased from the fiscal year 1998 budget request procurement plan of 1,000 aircraft at a maximum production rate of 60 aircraft per year. The committee understands that the Navy plans to determine its actual procurement objective based on the initial operational capability date of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

The committee is sensitive to the Navy's requirement to modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. Unfortunately, the Navy failed in its attempts to replace the A–6 and F–14 fleets first with the A–12 and then with the A/F–X, both of which were terminated. Consequently, the F/A–18E/F program emerged—more by default than by design—as the Navy's choice to replace the A–6 in the all-weather attack mission, replace the F–14 in the fleet air defense and tactical reconnaissance missions, and to supplement existing F/ A–18C/Ds. The F/A–18E/F improves range and payload capabilities compared to the F/A–18C/D, but it will not be nearly as survivable as either the A–12 or the A/F–X would have been. Accordingly, the committee strongly supports the Navy's participation in the JSF program to meet its longer-term force structure and modernization requirements and believes that the JSF will be more cost and operationally effective than any previous Naval aircraft when it enters service with the fleet. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million in PE63800N to accelerate development of the Naval variant of the JSF, as explained elsewhere in this report. The committee notes that the budget request proposal to reduce the quantity of F/A–18E/Fs procured in fiscal years 1998 and

1999 by 10 from the 60 proposed in the fiscal year 1997 acquisition plan, together with the QDR recommendation to reduce both the total procurement objective and the maximum production rate of this aircraft, suggests that future aircraft, shipbuilding, and other weapons procurement demands on the Navy's budget are necessitating consideration of alternative F/A–18E/F production rates. Accordingly, the committee recommends $1,348.9 million for continued F/A–18E/F production, a reduction of $752.2 million. The committee believes that until the review of the QDR by the independent National Defense Panel is completed in December 1997 and assessed by the Congress, the F/A–18E/F program should proceed at a slower pace.

(Page 183-184)
F/A–18E/F super hornet

The budget request contained $317.0 million in PE 24136N for the F/A–18 fleet. The committee understands that $267.5 million of this amount is for the F/A–18E/F Super Hornet and that funding for this program has increased $114.2 million over the amount forecast in the 1997 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).

The committee has expressed great concern, described in detail elsewhere in this report, over the unaffordable pace of tactical aviation (TACAIR) modernization being pursued by the Department. Of the three most costly TACAIR programs in the Department's request— the Air Force F–22 Raptor, the Navy F/A–18E/F Super Hornet, and the Joint Strike Fighter—the Super Hornet was recently approved by the Department to enter production, even prior to final recommendations by the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel.

The committee is unaware of any justification to support such a large increase in this year's research and development request for the Super Hornet over the recently forecast funding level identified in the 1997 FYDP. Therefore, the committee recommends $202.8 million for the F/A–18 fleet, a decrease of $114.2 million for the F/A–18E/F.

F/A–18F Tactical Reconnaissance

The budget request contained no funding for developing the F– 14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) Completely Digital (CD) capability.

The committee understands that the Navy plans to replace the F–14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) with an electro-optical podded system for the F/A–18F Super Hornet. The committee has closely monitored the technical issues and difficulties experienced by the Marine Corps with the internally mounted Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F/A– 18D. These issues, combined with the expected costs and extent of modifications to the F/A–18F if an internally mounted sensor were chosen, point to a podded reconnaissance capability as a more cost-effective and flexible approach for Navy fighter aircraft.

Therefore, the committee supports the Navy's decision to develop a non-dedicated podded reconnaissance capability for the Super Hornet. The committee expects that the Navy will adhere to this decision and stresses that it will not favor any future request for

development of an internally mounted F/A–18 reconnaissance capability. The committee believes that the Navy should, to the extent possible, ensure that the TARPS development be transferable to the F/A–18F pod. To ensure that the latest technologies are provided to the user, the committee directs that the development and procurement of the F/A–18F podded system be awarded competitively.

The committee has followed the TARPS digital imagery (DI) electro-optical (EO) improvements and is pleased with the results of this interim, but limited, capability. However, the committee believes there is a need to move to a production EO capability with a larger format backplane that provides both better resolution and a larger target area field-of-view, and understands that the TARPS CD development would provide such a capability at significantly less cost than a Navy purchase of the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS). Based on the successful results from the interim DI efforts, the committee is convinced that CD will provide a cost effective EO tactical manned reconnaissance capability to replace the current film-based F–14 pods. Therefore, the committee recommends $5.0 million in PE 24136N for TARPS CD non-recurring engineering. The committee directs the Navy to move to TARPS CD production as expeditiously as possible.

(Page 189)
Joint standoff weapon system

The budget request contained $71.5 million in PE 64727N for the joint standoff weapon system (JSOW). JSOW is a modular design that is being developed in three variants: a submunition dispenser, an anti-armor submunition dispenser, and a unitary warhead variant which will incorporate an imaging infrared seeker, data link and 500 pound blast fragmentation warhead. The committee understands that the submunition variant has completed development and initial operational testing with a success rate of over 96 percent and has been approved for low rate initial production with initial deliveries to the Navy for use in the F/A–18 in 1998. Initial procurement of the anti-armor submunition variant is scheduled for fiscal year 1999, however, current program funding levels would delay fielding of the unitary warhead variant until 2002. The committee recommends an increase of $9.0 million to accelerate the development and fielding of the unitary warhead variant.

(Page 257)
Section 217—Limitation on the Use of Funds for Adaptation of Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Program to F/A–18E/F Aircraft and AV–8B Aircraft.

This section would limit the Secretary of the Navy to obligating no more than 50 percent of the amount authorized to be appropriated for development of the IDECM program for adaptation to the F/A–18E/F and AV–8B aircraft until the amount authorized to be appropriated for development of the IDECM program for adaptation to the F/A–18C/D aircraft is completely obligated.

(Page 777-778)
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JAMES M. TALENT

I am pleased that the full committee, after vigorous debate, soundly rejected efforts to procure a mix of the older-model F/A– 18C/D and the new F/A–18E/F ''Super Hornet,'' and instead procure only the newer E/F. However, I must express my profound disagreement with the net result of the House National Security Committee's action, which was to reduce overall procurement funding for Super Hornets from the Navy's request of $2.1 billion for 20 low-rate initial-production aircraft to $1.348 billion, and to reduce the Navy's research and development request from $267.5 to $153.3 million. These reductions are entirely unjustified and will detract from the Navy's ability to execute its missions in the increasingly demanding threat environment of the next two decades.

The Secretary of Defense, in his June 10, 1997 letter, emphasized his ''strong support of the F/A–18E/F Super Hornet program,'' stating that ''our warfighters require the most advanced technology available.'' He further added that ''the Quadrennial Defense Review clearly validated the need for the F/A–18E/F…Without the E/ F we would be sending our pilots into combat at the turn of the century with the 1970s technology of the F/A–18C/D.''

The Chief of Naval Operations, in his own letter to the chairman and ranking member, expressed his ''strongest possible support for the F/A–18E/F program. It is the cornerstone of the future of carrier aviation and the Navy's number one aviation priority.'' Further, he recently stated to Congress that ''the multi-mission F/A– 18E/F Super Hornet is a leap forward in both TacAir design and survivability. The Super Hornet may look like its predecessor, however it is far larger, significantly more capable, and most importantly it is a first strike, every day strike, survivable weapon system for the foreseeable future.'' The Navy states that the Super Hornet will dominate all possible threats for at least the next two decades.

The CNO's letter further states that ''the E/F has flawlessly progressed through every required milestone to include operational requirements, mission needs, cost and threat analysis, and engine development. Admiral Johnson describes the entire aircraft program as ''a model of acquisition reform and unprecedented cost performance. The F/A–18E/F has completed significant portions of the flight rest program (over 1,100 flight hours)…Testing results have clearly exceeded all specific performance parameters. The program is on schedule, within budget and under specification weight.''

In terms of cost, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Dr. Kaminski, in his recent Selective Acquisition Report, found that the Super Hornet would cost only 13 percent more than its C/D predecessor based on production figures of 1,000 aircraft per program. His report pegged C/D per-unit cost at $36.5 million and E/ F per-unit cost at $41.6 million.

In terms of survivability, the Center for Naval Analysis in its recent report to Congress, reported that the Super Hornet would suffer roughly one fifth the losses of an F/A–18C/D airwing given the same threat environment and warfighter scenario. The

independent Institute for Defense Analysis, in its report requested by the Joint Staff, determined that the Super Hornet's survivability characteristics, to include a radar signature only one-tenth that of the older C/D, reduces the number of targets considered as ''high risk'' to the pilot and aircraft by 75 percent over the C/D Hornet it will replace.

Finally, it is essential to point out that the E/F program is not in competition with the emerging joint strike fighter concept. The Super Hornet will replace aging F–14s, whose operational costs the Navy desperately seeks to avoid, and older Hornets, all of which have reached the limits of their technological upgradability. The most optimistic forecast for a Navy version of the JSF is 2010, and even then the service would not be able to place a meaningful number of aircraft on its carrier decks until approximately 2015. The Super Hornet is indeed a ''bridge'' from the F–14 and C/D-model Hornets to the joint strike fighter, and that bridge by any reasonable estimate appears to be about two decades in length.

I am pleased that the House National Security Committee, after careful consideration of these important issues, declared its overwhelming and bipartisan support for the F/A–18E/F Super Hornet program. JAMES M. TALENT.

SASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-29)

(Page 68)
Section 124. Airborne self-protection jammer program.

The statement of managers language accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (H. Rept. 104–724) noted that the fiscal year 1997 authorization for the procurement of 36 airborne self protection jammer (ASPJ) systems was intended to provide a contingency response capability, and did not reflect the conferees'' commitment to additional procurement of ASPJ systems or to restarting series production for U.S. government customers at that time. Accordingly, the committee recommends a provision to end ASPJ procurement.

The committee recognizes the contribution that the ASPJ has made to the continuing mission in Bosnia. However, the committee does not support restarting serial production of the ASPJ due to its past testing failures and the nature of its rapidly aging technology. The committee instead encourages the Department to continue its efforts in the development of the integrated defensive electronics countermeasure (IDECM) system for the F/A–18E/F, and a spinoff capability for the F/A–18C/D to capitalize on emerging technology and commonality.

(Page 99-100)
F–22 event-based decision making

Section 218 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 required the Department of Defense to submit to Congress a report on event-based decision making for the F–22 aircraft program {fiscal year 1997 events} by October 1, 1996 and to submit the fiscal year 1998 event-based decisions with the budget request. As

of April 1, 1997, neither report had been received by Congress— six months after the first report was due.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 also required reports on the estimated cost of F–22 production and the net benefits of developing the F/A–18E/F. Funds were fenced, or withheld, in each of those cases, pending receipt of the reports. Those reports were received in a timely fashion, and a hearing was held to examine those reports and their implications. The committee can only infer that the Department only responds in a timely fashion to congressional direction when it is accompanied by conditional penalties or statutory prohibitions.

(Page 117-118)
Tactical aviation

Last year's Senate committee report on S.1745 (S. Rept. 104–267) laid the foundation for a thorough examination of tactical aviation modernization through the requirement of reports on the costs of the F–22 and its event-based program. Later, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201) added requirements to examine the net benefits of developing the F/A– 18E/F, its unit costs for various production rates, and a report on the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which has been renamed the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.

Of these reports, the reports on F–22 cost and F/A–18E/F net benefit included fences on program funding until the reports were provided to the Congress. Reports on F–22 event-based decision making were due on October 1, 1996 and February 3, 1997 with the submission of the budget request, and no restriction was placed on the program pending receipt of the event-based reports. As of April, 1997, those reports had not been received, leading the committee to believe that the Department only provides important background for decisions where there are penalties for noncompliance. The report on the JAST (now JSF) program is due on May 15, 1998.

In addition to these reports, the committee is aware that the Department has formed a tactical aviation working group within the Joint Staff to assess various options for future decisions related to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The committee notes that before the QDR was completed, program requests had changed from calendar year 1996 to calendar year 1997, in part because of assumptions about the outcome of the QDR. Also, programs have changed without any reference to the strategy-based work of the QDR. For example, the restructure of F–22 engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) occurred through an infusion of production funds in development to make up for a $2.2 billion overrun, and the F/A–18E/F program has been cut by four aircraft.

The Subcommittee on AirLand Forces held two hearings on tactical aviation modernization to receive testimony on both the broad strategic considerations of tactical aviation and programmatic considerations and the costs of the present administration plan. Many themes emerged from the hearings, especially:

(1) the present program for modernization is unaffordable;
(2) the tactical aviation modernization program does not seem to be based on a clear strategy; and

(3) the Navy and Air Force have a different assessment of future needs or a different approach to meeting the future.

While awaiting the preliminary results of the QDR, the committee intends to put the tactical aviation modernization program into a placeholder status for fiscal year 1998, pending clear decisions from the department on its future requirements and programs.

(Page 119-120)

Section 211. Joint Strike Fighter program.

The budget request included $930.8 million in three program elements: $448.9 in PE 603800N; $458.1 million in PE 603800F; and $23.9 million in PE 603800E for development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Tactical aviation programs have been the subject of intense scrutiny during committee and subcommittee hearings. One theme that emerged consistently has been the overall cost of the three planned programs: the F–22; F/A–18E/F; and the JSF. The issue of requirements and the relationship to known or postulated threats has been a second consistent theme.

Realizing that the JSF program emerged from an amalgam of developmental programs that were individually unaffordable, the committee has been encouraged by the program's consistent emphasis on unit cost and the incorporation of emerging technologies to provide improved capabilities within strict cost guidelines.

The continued progress of the JSF program offers real hope for acquiring advanced aircraft designed to be efficiently manufactured and supported through a common support structure. While the concepts, goals, and progress to date have been encouraging, the committee views with concern the proposed order of fielding finished JSF aircraft. The program cancellations and combinations that led to the JSF most directly affected the Navy's strike capability. For example, the A-12 program cancellation that was the result of a program overrun that exceeded one billion dollars, and the subsequent tactical aviation restructurings led to a near-term situation that is the exact reverse of what it should be. Instead of a small number of stealth type aircraft based forward on aircraft carriers and a significant force of capable multi-role aircraft to wage the larger type campaigns such as Desert Storm, the stealth aircraft are based in the heart of America, where they can be moved forward only after a foothold has been established or host nations provide support and the multi-role aircraft are on board carriers.

In an attempt to reset the balance in the future, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Navy stealthy strike aircraft capable of carrier-based strike operations are expeditiously fielded as the first priority of the JSF program. The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees that would describe the development and production sequencing for the various JSF aircraft, not later than February 15, 1998.

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Integrated defensive electronic countermeasures

The budget request included $51.8 million for the continuing development of the integrated defensive electronic countermeasures (IDECM) system. Though designed for

the F/A–18E/F, the IDECM radio frequency countermeasures (RFCM) system may be a cost effective solution for the needs of the F/A–18C/D, and allow for efficiencies through commonality and reduced support costs. The committee recommends an increase of $15.0 million to the IDECM program in order to expand operational tests of the basic system to include the onboard configuration for the F/A–18C/D, thus accelerating the low rate initial production decision to June 1999 for both configurations.

CASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-340)

(Page 32-33)
SEC. 213. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the options for the sequence in which the variants of the joint strike fighter are to be produced and fielded.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report shall contain the following:

(1) A review of the plan for production under the Joint Strike Fighter program that was used by the Department of Defense for developing the funding estimates for the fiscal year 1999 budget request for the Department of Defense.

(2) An estimate of the costs, and an analysis of the costs and benefits, of producing the joint strike fighter variants in a sequence that provides for fielding of the naval variant of the aircraft first.

(3) A comparison of the costs and benefits of the various options for the sequence for fielding the variants of the joint strike fighter that the Secretary of Defense considers likely to be the options from among which a sequence for fielding is selected, including a discussion of the effects that selection of each such option would have on the costs and rates of production of the units of F/A–18E/F and F–22 aircraft that are in production when the Joint Strike Fighter Program proceeds into production.

(4) A certification that the Joint Strike Fighter Program contains sufficient funding to carry out an alternate engine development program that includes flight qualification of an alternate engine in a joint strike fighter airframe.

(c) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS PENDING SUBMISSION OF REPORT.— Not more than 90 percent of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under this Act for the Joint Strike Fighter Program may be obligated until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive the report required under this section.

(d) FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘fiscal year 1999 budget request for the Department of Defense’’ means the budget estimates for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1999 that were submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in connection with the

submission of the budget for fiscal year 1998 to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(Page 527-528)
Common Avionics Changes

The budget request included $131.6 million for common avionics changes, but did not contain any funding to procure AN/ AWW–13 guided weapon control monitor sets. The AN/AWW–13 provides the data link capability for F/A–18 series aircraft to employ the precision-guided Walleye and the Stand-off Land Attack Missiles.

The Senate amendment would authorize the budget request. The House bill would authorize an additional $9.0 million to continue AN/AWW–13 production.

The House bill would also provide an additional $4.0 million in PE 64215N for integration of the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) into the Navy/Marine Corps helicopters fleets.

The conferees agree to authorize $130.4 million, which includes an additional $6.0 million to continue AN/AWW–13 production and $4.0 million for GPWS integration. These increases are offset by a $10.0 million reduction for late obligations and a $1.2 million reduction for systems engineering growth in other programs funded in this budget line.

(Page 556-557)

The conferees direct that the miscellaneous funding be allocated exclusively by reserve component chiefs and that reserve component chiefs give priority consideration to the following items: medium truck extended service programs; carrier modifications; CH–47 helicopters; multiple launch rocket systems; Avenger air defense systems (including table top trainers); training simulator devices; night vision equipment; mobile backscatter truck inspection system; heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wrecker; HEMTT fuel tanker conversion kit; all terrain crane (20 ton); Atlas 10K variable reach forklift; barge derrick; reverse osmosis water purification unit, 3 thousand gallons per hour; 5KW generator set; MK–19 grenade machine gun; F/A–18 modifications; C–9 replacement aircraft; SH–60B Seahawk helicopter; mobile inshore underwater van upgrades; logistics vehicle system (LVS); MK 48 front power unit; LVS rear body units; F/A–18+ modifications; CH–53E helicopters; F–16 situational awareness data link; F–16 laser designator/ targeting pods; A–10 situational awareness data link; A–10 electronic warfare management system; F–16 upgraded data transfer unit; HH–60 helicopter self protection system; F–16 electronic warfare management system; ALQ–131 multiplexer bus interface; C–130 integrated electronic warfare suite; enhanced flightline security systems; combat arms training equipment; C–5 simulator; vibration management enhancement program; 5 ton truck; maneuver control system; CH–47D full authority digital engine control; small arms engagement skills trainers; CH–47D fuel cells; M917

dump trucks; B–1 enhancements; F–16/A–10 digital transfer cartridge; and F–16 C/D onboard oxygen generating system.

Funding allocated by reserve component chiefs for miscellaneous equipment must meet the following criteria:

(1) there is a requirement for the equipment that has been validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council;
(2) that such equipment is included for reserve component modernization in the future-years defense program;
(3) that such equipment is consistent with the use of reserve component forces called for in Department warplans; and
(4) the funds can be obligated during the fiscal year for which funds have been authorized and appropriated.

Overall, the conferees agree to authorize a total of $2.2 billion for National Guard and Reserve equipment and aircraft.

(Page 664)
BOL expendable dispenser system

The conferees are aware of the important survivability enhancement that the BOL expendable dispenser system provides our operational F–14 aircraft, and the potential capability that the system may provide for other aircraft.

The Congress provided approximately $18.0 million in fiscal year 1997 for final testing and qualification of the BOL on the F/ A–18C/D aircraft. The conferees understand that progress in testing and qualification has been slow, despite the Navy's expressed desire to accelerate the program for the F/A–18C/D. The conferees direct the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress with the submission of the fiscal year 1999 budget on the results of the Navy's assessment and intentions regarding qualification and potential fielding the BOL system on the F/A–18C/D aircraft.

HAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-206)

(Page 8-9)

Major weapons programs: The Committee recommends fully funding the budget request for: The Army's Comanche helicopter, Crusader next-generation artillery system, and Force XXI/ digitization initiatives (although the Committee has realigned requested funding to more appropriate accounts); the Navy's production of 20 new F/A–18 E/F fighters, three DDG–51 destroyers, one New Attack Submarine, the overhaul of the U.S.S. Nimitz aircraft carrier, and the procurement of two LMSR sealift ships; and the Air Force's F–15 fighter and F–22 fighter programs. The Committee has also funded the requested number of Air Force C–17 transport aircraft; provided an additional nine C–130J variants over the budget request for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Air National Guard, pursuant to House authorization action; and the budget request for the Joint Strike Fighter. The Committee has added funds over the request for: Army Blackhawk helicopters (a total of $309,231,000 for 30 helicopters, $126,000,000 and 12 helicopters

more than requested) and Kiowa Warrior helicopters ($151,700,000); the Navy E–2C airborne early warning aircraft (a total of $304,474,000 for four aircraft, $68,000,000 and one aircraft over the budget request); the Marine Corps V–22 tactical transport (a total of $661,307,000 for seven aircraft, $189,300,000 and two aircraft more than in the budget request), and advance procurement for the second LPD–17 amphibious ship (an increase of $185,000,000 over the budget request); and the Air Force B–2 bomber (a total of $505,286,000, an increase over the budget request of $331,200,000, consistent with House authorization action), and F–16 fighter programs ($82,500,000 and three aircraft more than the budget request).

(Page 20)
PROCUREMENT

The Committee recommends $45,515,962,000 in new obligational authority for Procurement, an increase of $3,930,784,000 over the fiscal year 1998 budget request. Major programs funded in the bill include:

$309,231,000 for 30 UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters
$474,832,000 for upgrades and modifications to Apache helicopters
$228,287,000 for 1,056 Hellfire missiles $143,112,000 for 1,080 Javelin missiles
$240,591,000 for Bradley vehicle industrial base sustainment
$594,856,000 for upgrades to Abrams tanks
$209,446,000 for medium tactical vehicles
$302,164,000 for SINCGARS radios
$2,101,100,000 for 20 F/A–18 E/F fighter aircraft
$661,307,000 for 7 V–22 (Osprey) aircraft
$304,474,000 for 4 E–2C early warning aircraft
$243,960,000 for 12 T–45 trainer aircraft
$1,632,544,000 for the modification of naval aircraft
$181,092,000 for 127 Standard missiles
$2,314,903,000 for 1 new SSN attack submarine
$1,628,403,000 for 1 carrier refueling overhaul
$2,695,367,000 for 3 DDG–51 destroyers
$505,286,000 for B–2 aircraft
$159,000,000 for 3 F–15 fighter aircraft
$1,914,211,000 for 9 C–17 airlift aircraft
$1,464,861,000 for modification of Air Force aircraft
$107,168,000 for 173 AMRAAM missiles
$384,600,000 for Ballistic Missile Defense

(Page 106-107)
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
F/A–18E/F HORNET

The Navy requested $2,101,100,000 to procure 20 F/A–18E/F Hornet aircraft. The Committee recommends providing the amount requested. The Navy has invested $4,982,000,000 in development and $2,408,000,000 to produce F/A–18E/F aircraft through fiscal year 1997. The F/A–18E/F offers significant warfighting improvements for Naval aviation which will be used for decades: the F/A– 18E/F can fly 40 percent farther, remain on station 80 percent longer, carry more weapons, and is more lethal and survivable than current generation F/A–18C/D aircraft which have no room for modern avionics upgrades. Aircraft weight remains well below the specification weight requirement, even with all known potential increases considered. With funds appropriated by Congress in prior years, production of the F/A–18E/F is well underway. The program is considered to be a model acquisition and it was recently endorsed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense recently informed the defense committees that the F/A–18E/ F Super Hornet program is a cornerstone of the Defense Department's tactical air modernization program. Recent General Accounting Office reports on the F/A–18E/F have raised valid points about potential cost savings from buying older generation F/A–18C/ D model aircraft rather than the new model, but they have not disclosed a single major significant cost or technical difficulty. For these many reasons, the Committee endorses the need to increase F/A–18E/F production in fiscal year 1998 because of the need to attain lower per unit costs through efficient high-rate production, but more importantly, to field vital warfighting capability to the fleet as soon as possible.

(Page 185)
DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION
AVIATION SURVIVABILITY

The Navy requested $7,859,000 for aviation survivability. The Committee recommends $16,959,000, an increase of $9,100,000 only for development of the Navy Integrated day/night all-weather display helmet into the AV–8B, F/A–18, and Advance Strike Fighter aircraft and $3,000,000 is only for visualization architecture and technology at the Naval Aircraft Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River.

CAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 105-265)

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MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

The conferees agree that each of the Chiefs of the Reserve and National Guard components should exercise control of modernization funds provided in this account including aircraft and aircraft modernization. The conferees further agree that separate submissions of a detailed assessment of its modernization priorities by each of the Guard and Reserve component commanders is required to be submitted to the defense committees. The conferees expect the component commanders to give priority consideration to the following items: CH–47D helicopters, F–14A modifications, magic lantern, F/A–18 modifications, C–9 replacement aircraft, CH–53 helicopters, C–5 simulators, vibration management enhancement program, UH–60L, laser leveling

equipment, engagement skills trainers, MELIOS night vision devices, F–16 improved avionics intermediate shops, ultimate building machines, air defense alerting devices (ADAD), A–2 bradley upgrades, ALR–56 radar warning receiver, AN/TQM–41 MMS, avengers, theater deployable communication packages, dragon missile upgrades, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), magic lantern spares, small arms simulators, senior scout modifications, field artillery ammunition support vehicles (FAASVs), KC–135R reengining, night vision devices and driver's night viewers, heavy equipment transport system (HETS), paladin, M–1A2 tanks, CH–47 FADEC, medium truck extended service programs (ESP), F–16 C/D onboard oxygen generating system field installation and evaluation by the Air National Guard, M–270 launcher mechanical systems (ILMS), high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, LITENING targeting and navigation pods, all-terrain cranes, modular airborne fire fighting system units, CH–47 internal crash worthy fuel cells, back scatter truck inspection systems, night vision equipment, CH–47 ICH aircraft, commercial industrial equipment, high speed dirt compactors, AH–64 combat mission simulators, high mobility trailers for HMMWVs, palletized loading systems, heavy expanded mobility tactical truck wreckers, M109A6, automatic building machines, air defense alerting device systems, interactive simulators, master cranes, deployable universal combat earth movers, HEMTT wreckers, and AN/VRC–102 Radios.