COMMITTEE LANGUAGE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
UAVs

TACTICAL UAV
ACCOUNT: RDT&E, Navy

PRESBUD	HASC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
69,742	75,742	69,742	75,742	77,242	69,742	75,742

PREDATOR UAV
ACCOUNT: AP, AF

PRESBUD	HASC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
(3)38,003	(3)58,003	(3)38,003	(3)58,003	(3)58,003	(3)38,003	(3)58,003

TACTICAL UAV
ACCOUNT: RDT&E, ARMY

PRESBUD	HASC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
3,866	3,866	3,866	49,729	43,866	3,866	43,866

HASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-162)

Page 110, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

024	ADVANCE PROCUREMENT (CY)	-	-	46,000	-	46,000
025	HAEUAV	-	-		-	-
026	PREDATOR UAV	3	38,003	20,000	3	58,003

Page 112,Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

065	PREDATOR MODS	-	-		-	-
	OTHER MODIFICATIONS					
066	CLASSIFIED PROJECTS	-	9,390		-	9,390

Page 163, RDT&E, Army

0305204A	174	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	3,866		3,866
0305206A	175	AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,932		4,932

Page 186, RDT&E, Navy

0305204M	183	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	-		-
0305204N	184	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	6,000	75,742
		Multi-function Self-aligned Gate Arrays [+3.0 M in PE 35207F]			[+3,000]
		Tactical Control System			[+3,000]
		System Integration Lab			[4,500]
0305206N	185	AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,958	5,000	9,958

Page 119, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

Predator unmanned aerial vehicle

The budget request contained $38.0 million for three Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and one ground control station (GCS). The committee notes that the Predator has been flying support missions in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, for over three and one-half years, logging more than 11,000 total flight hours. Because of its importance to theater commanders' intelligence needs, a solid production base for this system must be continued, attrition reserve vehicles must be maintained, and improvements must be made to fully exploit the potential of this system. For example, the committee believes the laser designator upgrades now being integrated into the aircraft for immediate contingency needs should be put into long-term production. Also, Predator operations are expected to be expanded to other theaters and operational areas. However, the committee under-stands Predator is currently not deployable worldwide because of some host-nation communications frequency restrictions. The committee believes the Air Force needs to add the tactical common data link (TCDL) to the air vehicles and the GCS to overcome this operational limitation. Finally, the committee notes that when using satellite communications control of an aircraft, the GCS can only control a single air vehicle at a time. This precludes dual aircraft control for on-station relief that has been demonstrated with the line-of-sight data link. A dual-channel beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications capability needs to be retrofitted into existing aircraft. Therefore, the committee recommends $58.0 million, an increase of $20.0 million to procure two additional attrition reserve UAVs and for production versions/kits of the laser designator, the dual-channel satellite communications suite and the TCDL.

Page 203, RDT&E, Navy –Items of Special Interest

Multi-function self-aligned gate technology

The budget request contained $69.7 million in PE 35204N for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and $9.4 million in 35207F for manned reconnaissance systems. No funding was provided in either program element for the multi-function self-aligned gate (MSAG) active aperture antenna (AAA) technology. The Congress has supported this AAA technology for several years, and the committee is pleased with the successful MSAG antenna demonstration completed in August 1998. During this unprecedented demonstration, the MSAG provided wide-band, duplex communications links simultaneously to a ground vehicle, an aircraft, and a satellite surrogate. The committee believes that a single, electronically-steered antenna array that can provide multiple wide-band communications links would be a cost-effective solution to numerous Department of Defense communications requirements. However, the committee is concerned to note that the Department has failed to provide even minimal funding for this technology. The committee understands that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) is considering initiation of an advanced concept technology demonstration of the MSAG technology and that the Air Force is supportive of testing this antenna technology on reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million in PE 35204N for operational evaluation of the MSAG AAA on the tactical control station and the Predator UAV. The committee also recommends an increase of $3.0 million in PE 35207F for evaluation of the MSAG AAA onboard the RC–135 Rivet Joint aircraft.

Tactical control system

The budget request contained $69.7 million in PE 35204N for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and included $24.6 million for the tactical control system (TCS). No funding was provided for the operation of the UAV systems integration laboratory (SIL) or to continue its development of the multiple UAV simulation environment (MUSE). The committee continues to be supportive of the TCS and notes that TCS software is the key to interoperability for future medium-altitude and tactical UAVs and their payloads. Further, the committee is supportive of the TCS objective to interface with high-altitude UAVs. The committee notes that the Naval Surface Warfare Center pro-gram office continues to develop most of the TCS software and expend most of the TCS developmental funding in-house. The committee believes that the TCS program could be more efficiently managed if the TCS developments, including software engineering and maintenance, were to be outsourced in whole to the prime system integration contractor. Further, the committee believes such outsourcing would allow for a smaller and more efficient government program office. The committee believes that holding a prime contractor responsible for total system performance has demonstrated success with many other programs. Finally, the committee notes that the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) has been without a TCS capability for its UAV testing, and that additional funding is required to provide such a capability. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million for procuring a TCS ground station for USACOM. Further, the committee directs a reallocation of $4.5 million within PE 35204N specifically to realize the program office efficiencies discussed above and to move software development and maintenance responsibility to the prime contractor. This funding is to be reapplied within the TCS program to fund the SIL MUSE efforts.

Tactical Tomahawk

The budget request contained $147.2 million in PE 24229N for Tomahawk and Theater Mission Planning Center operational systems development, including $145.3 million for the Tactical Tomahawk program. The committee has supported the Navy's initiation of the Tactical Tomahawk program. However, the committee report on H.R. 3116 (H. Rept. 105–532) expressed ability to establish a competitive environment for future Tactical Tomahawk procurement and directed the Secretary of the Navy to report to the Congressional defense committees the Navy's plan for ensuring competitiveness in the production phase of the program. The Secretary's letter report, dated September 25, 1998, noted the Navy's decision to continue with the current Tomahawk manufacturer for both the Tactical Tomahawk development contract and the full rate production program that would commence in fiscal year 2003. The report also asserted that the cost to the Navy associated with acquisition of a comprehensive technical data package for the missile and facilitating a second source would be prohibitive and that the delay in bringing on a second source would not sup-port the required schedule for the delivery of missiles to the fleet. The committee notes that the justification and approval (J&A) on which the sole-source decision for the Tactical Tomahawk program was based stated that the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract would require the contractor to develop and maintain a complete technical data package to support EMD and future missile production. The committee also notes that since the approval of the J&A and award of the EMD contract for Tactical Tomahawk, the Navy has determined that it does not have the ability to provide a technical data package to firms that would wish to compete in related warhead programs because the ''EMD con-tract does not include a requirement for a technical data package.'' The committee believes that the Navy's decision not to acquire a technical data package for the Tactical Tomahawk denies the ability to establish a second production source for the missile, should that be required in the future, and the ability of the Navy to compete any future procurement of the missile. In view of the operational expenditures of the Tomahawk missile as a weapon of choice in current operations and the imminent need to replace those expenditures, the committee considers such a policy short-sighted. The committee also notes that the estimated cost of the Tactical Tomahawk program dictate that any procurement decision should be made only after a formal defense acquisition program milestone decision review at an appropriate time in the development pro-gram. The committee believes that such a milestone decision re-view should consider measures for establishing competitiveness in the production phase of the program. The committee recommends the budget request of $147.2 million for continuation of the Tomahawk development program. The committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to review the Tactical Tomahawk program and the decision not to acquire a technical data package for the missile. The Secretary shall report to the Congressional defense committees by December 31, 1999, on measures that will be taken to insure competition in future Tactical Tomahawk procurement and related pro-grams.

Unmanned aerial vehicles

The committee notes that the Congress directed the establishment of the office of Director for Expeditionary Warfare (N85) with-in the Chief of Naval Operations as a provision of Public Law 102– 484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. This action was taken to address Congressional concerns about the adequacy of Navy resources dedicated to expeditionary

warfare areas such as amphibious lift, mine warfare, and naval surface fire support. The Navy subsequently established responsibility for requirements generation and resource sponsorship for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and assigned the new responsibilities to the expeditionary warfare directorate based on the vital role these systems play in reconnaissance and targeting support to expeditionary operations. The committee understands that the Navy is considering transferring responsibility for naval UAVs from N85 to the office of the Director of Air Warfare (N88). The committee is concerned that the migration of responsibility for naval UAVs may lead to decreased emphasis on the vital role these systems perform in expeditionary operations. The committee urges the Navy to consult the Congressional defense committees on any planned transfer of responsibility for naval UAVs and provide sufficient rationale prior to executing such a transfer.

SASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-50)

Page 179, RDT&E, Navy

0305204M	183	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES		-	-
0305204N	184	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	-	69,742
0305206N	185	AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,958	-	4,958

Page 220, RDT&E, Defensewide

0305204D8	143	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	-	-
0305205D8	144	ENDURANCE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	-	-

Pages 138 and 139; Defense Procurement – Other Items of Interest

Unmanned aerial vehicle system
The budget request included:
(1) $3.9 million in PE 305204A for research and development and $45.9 million in Other Procurement, Army, to procure a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) system;
(2) $38.5 million in PE 304204N for development of a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAV (VTUAV) for the Navy;
(3) $24.5 million in PE 304204N for development of the tactical control system (TCS), a common ground control, and information distribution system for UAVs;
(4) $4.0 million in PE 305205F for research and development and $38.0 million in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, to procure the Predator medium altitude endurance UAV;
(5) $66.8 million in PE 305205F for research and development for high altitude endurance UAVs.
Given the fact that UAV programs were devolved to the military services, there is the possibility that service-unique or mission specific aspects could creep into these programs. In disestablishing the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), Congress was seeking a better way of managing reconnaissance development and acquisition programs. The committee does not believe that ''better'' means a departure from the common control systems and inter-faces that should be available under the TCS program. The Navy will use TCS as the control system for VTUAV. The Army TUAV program has established a threshold requirement that TCS be ''interoperable'' with the TUAV, which could result in overlapping costs associated with developing another ground control system and making it interoperable with TCS. The committee continues to sup port Army efforts to improve its ability to survey the battlefield. However, the Army should understand that the committee will not support a TUAV system that includes unnecessary duplication of effort by developing and procuring a different ground control system.
The Air Force HAE and MAE programs remain unclear. Before the TCS program began, the Navy had developed a ground control system for the Predator, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was developing a common ground segment for the HAE programs. Nevertheless, to take full advantage of future pay-loads and to support deployed forces, Predator must be able to achieve a significant level of interoperability with TCS. Transition to TCS save life cycle costs. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to investigate the
costs and benefits of transitioning to TCS to support the Predator UAV, and the extent to which TCS could be used to support HAE operations. The committee directs the Secretary to report the results of the review to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2000.

Page 226; Defense RDT&E

Boost-phase intercept
The committee is aware that BMDO and the government of Israel have examined options for boost-phase intercept (BPI) of ballistic missiles, and the possibility of a joint U.S.-Israeli program using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to defeat ballistic missiles in the boost-phase or missile launchers following the launch of a missile. The committee understands that to date there is no agreement between the two governments on the potential merits of the options considered, nor has agreement been reached on a joint pro-gram. Believing that the ability to defeat ballistic missiles before and during their launch phase could significantly enhance the security of

the United States and its allies, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to study the technical and operational feasibility of such a joint program, and determine if the missile defense benefits would justify initiating a joint U.S.-Israel BPI-attack operations program employing UAVs. The study shall include an assessment of whether a BPI-attack operations program can be developed that supports U.S. and Israeli requirements, whether the United States would support a program that is oriented primarily or exclusively toward satisfying Israeli requirements, and whether DOD supports an attack operations UAV system that does not include BPI capabilities. The committee directs the Secretary to submit a report on these matters to the congressional defense commit-tees not later than February 15, 2000.

CASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-301)

Page 559, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

24	ADVANCE PROCUREMENT (CY)	-	-	-	46,000	-	-	-	46,000	-	46,000
25	HAEUAV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	PREDATOR UAV	3	38,003	3	58,003	3	38,003	-	20,000	3	58,003

Page 609, RDT&E, Army

0305204A	174	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	3,866	3,866	3,866	-	49,729
		Transfer from Other Procurement, Army				45,863	

Page 623, RDT&E, Navy

0305204M	183	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	-	-	-	-	-
0305204N	184	TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	75,742	69,742	-	75,742
		Multi-Function Self-Aligned Gate Arrays		[3,000]		3,000	
		Tactical Control Systems		[3,000]		3,000	

Page 517, Other Procurement, Army

Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
The budget request included $45.9 million for the procurement of the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV).
The Senate bill and the House amendment would authorize the budget request.
The conferees agree to transfer $45.9 million from Other Procurement, Army to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army, an increase of $45.9 million in PE 35204A, due to a delay in production and a requirement for continued TUAV development.

Page 562, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

Predator unmanned aerial vehicle
The budget request included $38.0 million for the procurement of three Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems.
The Senate bill would authorize the budget request.
The House amendment would authorize an increase of $20.0 million for the procurement of two additional UAVs and other associated systems.
The conferees agree to authorize an increase of $20.0 million for the procurement of attrition Predator UAVs and associated systems.

Page 631, RDT&E, Navy

Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
The budget request included $69.7 million in PE 35204N for development of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). No funding was included for the operation of the Army's UAV systems integration laboratory (SIL), to continue development of the multiple UAV simulation environment (MUSE), or to continue development of the multi-function self-aligned gate (MSAG) active antenna array technology.
The Senate bill would authorize the budget request.

The House amendment would authorize an increase of $6.0 million, as follows:
(1) an increase of $3.0 million for the tactical control system (TCS) ground station; and
(2) an increase of $3.0 million for (MSAG) active antenna array.
The House amendment would also shift $4.5 million of TCS software development and maintenance efforts to fund the SIL.
The conferees agree to authorize an increase of $6.0 million in PE 35204N, $3.0 for the TCS ground station and $3.0 million for MSAG.
The conferees reiterate their support for the operation of the SIL and continued development of the MUSE. The conferees also believe the SIL and MUSE support all service UAV developments and exercise support, and therefore all services should support their operation. The conferees understand that $1.5 million of the fiscal year 2000 TCS request is to fund SIL developments supporting the TCS program. The conferees expect the Department to fund any remaining fiscal year 2000 and future year requirements.
Elsewhere in this report, the conferees have recommended shifting $45.9 million from Army procurement of tactical UAVs to research and development of tactical UAVs. The conferees encourage the Army to use SIL/MUSE support in executing the Army's fiscal year 2000 tactical UAV development effort.
The conferees direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to provide a report to the congressional defense and intelligence committees, no later than November 15, 1999, on how the Department intends tosupport high priority SIL and MUSE efforts in fiscal year 2000.

HAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-244)

Page 173, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

E-8C	1	260,269	2	460,469	+1	+188,200
PREDATOR UAV	3	38,003	3	58,003	--	+20,000

Page 220, RDT&E, Army

SECURITY AND INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES	---	10,000	+10,000
TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	3,866	43,866	+40,000

Page 226, RDT&E, Navy

Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	69,742	77,242	+7,500
Multifunction self-aligned gate			+4,500
Tactical control system—UAV			+3,000
System integration lab			+4,500
Tactical control system—program office			−4,500
Airborne Reconnaissance Systems	4,958	18,958	+14,000

Page 20 and 21, Major Committee Recommendations

AIR FORCE PROGRAM REPRIORITIZATION

As outlined earlier in this report, the Air Force is currently facing critical problems in terms of personnel, overall readiness, and funding for many essential warfighting needs, including many that give U.S. forces significant operational advantages over any adversary. The Committee believes the case for addressing these shortfalls as soon as possible is compelling. At the same time, the Committee is not convinced that the F–22 program as currently constituted can continue as planned, especially considering the other difficulties confronting the Air Force and the DoD generally.

Therefore, the Committee believes that unless and until the Air Force and the Department of Defense can clearly demonstrate how they intend to meet these competing demands, continued F–22 production is not justified at this time. The Committee thus recommends an F–22 "production pause" until these issues can be resolved. To implement this recommendation, the Committee specifically denies the $1.8 billion F–22 production funding requested for fiscal year 2000. The Secretary of the Air Force is further directed to take all necessary actions to cease production of aircraft funded in fiscal year 1999 and use all available procurement funds provided in that year to finance activities needed to ensure an orderly pause in the production program.

The Committee does approve the budgeted amount of $1.2 billion for F–22 development. These funds are provided in expectation that they will be used to complete the buy of nine F–22 development aircraft previously purchased. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to use these funds to take all necessary actions to restructure the ongoing F–22 development program into an affordable demonstration program tailored to reduce the risk of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Committee's expectation is that nine F–22 test aircraft currently funded will be more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this tailored demonstration program. The Committee therefore directs that none of the funds provided for the F–22 can be used to acquire more than nine flying test aircraft without written prior notification to the congressional defense committees. The Committee further reminds the Air Force that section 8090 of the Committee bill prohibits the use of research and development funding for procurement of aircraft for operational use.

Regarding other major Air Force issues, the Committee recommands significant increases over the budget request for a variety of programs such as: Air Force personnel recruiting and retention incentives (including $300 million over the budget for the aviation continuation pay program, targeted at retaining mid-grade pilots); spare parts and war reserve shortages; quality of life upgrades at Air Force facilities; and weapons modernization enhancements. The latter includes additions over the budget request for new production F–15 and F–16 fighters, and upgrades for these aircraft. The Committee also has provided funds over the budget request for bomber modernization, to accelerate upgrades to the existing inventory of B–52, B–1 and B–2 bombers, and has also increased funding for precision guided weapons. The Committee also proposes adding funding for a variety of Air Force reconnaissance assets including one additional Joint STARS aircraft, additional Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and upgrades to existing RC–135 RIVET JOINT and U–2 surveillance platforms. The Committee also provides sizable increases in funding for the KC–135 tanker and RIVET JOINT engine upgrade programs. Finally, the Committee also adds $100 million to the Joint Strike Fighter program for risk reduction efforts. Additional details on these and other Air Force program adjustments can be found elsewhere in this report.

Page 25, Tactical Reconnaissance

	Amount
RIVET JOINT	+102,200,000
U–2	+36,000,000
Joint SIGINT Avionics Family	+17,400,000

The Committee believes that these funds will provide significant tactical reconnaissance capability for future operations. The Department should ensure that the benefits from these increases are

TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

During Operation Allied Force and the subsequent deployment of NATO peace keeping troops in the Balkans region, the Committee believes the Department of Defense learned at least two important lessons with respect to tactical reconnaissance: it is extremely valuable and there are not enough assets. It was clear to many of the commanders that the RIVET JOINT and unmanned aerial vehicle assets became the best "eyes and ears" tactical intelligence monitoring available in theater. The problem is that there are a limited number of these assets and staffing is extremely lean.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles proved their worth during Operation Allied Force. The vehicles could fly at altitudes and in areas that could not and should not be attempted by manned aircraft. The vehicles were vulnerable to enemy fire but managed to provide valuable intelligence that was used to target future strikes and monitor troop movements.

The RIVET JOINT, U–2 and special Navy manned reconnaissance aircraft were also effective during Operation Allied Force. These aircraft were a lucrative source of intelligence and logged in excess of 700 sorties over Kosovo and surrounding areas. Due to their effectiveness, these assets were popular with local commanders. However, the numbers of these aircraft are incredibly limited which puts tremendous pressure on aircrews.

Despite the obvious benefits of these reconnaissance assets and the fact that they are major providers of intelligence for force protection, target acquisition, troop movements, and battle damage assessment, the Department's fiscal year 2000 budget does not include adequate funding for its tactical reconnaissance requirements. Therefore, the Committee has included a total of $270,100,000 above the budget request to fund a variety of upgrades for tactical reconnaissance assets.

The following is a list of the additional major items for which funding is provided by the Committee:

	Amount
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	+$20,000,000
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	+25,000,000

Page 134, Other Procurement, Army

TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (TUAV)

The Committee supports the Army's revised Acquisition Strategy for the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV). This revised strategy was outlined in a March 26, 1999 letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. The revised strategy includes the termination of the Outrider Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration and a new competition to meet the Army's TUAV requirement.

The Committee notes that since the new strategy was presented to Congress after submission of the fiscal year 2000 budget, funding for the TUAV was not requested in the proper appropriation. The Army requested procurement funding for the Outrider vehicle, not research and development funding for the new acquisition strategy. The Committee has made the necessary correction by reducing Outrider procurement funding by $45,863,000 and increasing the research and development funding for tactical unmanned aerial vehicle by $40,000,000, a net reduction of $5,863,000 which the Committee believes is justified given the revised acquisition plan.

The Committee directs that the Army consider reliability and interoperability with the Tactical Control System (TCS) as critical source selection evaluation criteria for the new TUAV.

Page 315, Additional Views

F–22 Consumes Too Much Funding Needed For Other Military Capabilities.—In making this decision, the Committee reviewed not only what capability the F–22 can provide for the future compared to other planes, but what capability we are giving up because of the cost of this plane—the so-called "opportunity cost." It is now clear from experiences in Yugoslavia and Iraq that other Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aviation capabilities are being stretched dangerously thin in certain key areas because of the need to pay the exorbitant F–22 budget costs. It is also clear that from a larger perspective, the F–22 is consuming resources that could be used to address other critical strategic concerns such as emerging threats from chemical/biological/nuclear terrorism, information warfare, and cruise missiles.

The Committee has recognized that it takes more than an ultra-sophisticated fighter to successfully prosecute modern-day air operations. It requires a total balanced and integrated system, starting with highly trained and well-motivated aircrews. It also depends on sophisticated surveillance systems such as the AWACS and JSTARS systems, modern information and communications systems to provide instantaneous situation awareness, sophisticated missiles, electronic jamming support, intelligence gathering platforms such as the U–2 and various unmanned aerial vehicles, and support from refueling tankers and specialized helicopters.

The Committee rightly believes that the Pentagon is over-emphasizing fighter procurement, proposing to buy this expensive high tech fighter at a cost that will severely limit other weapons purchases and upgrades. This could actually degrade performance in the years ahead, since there will be no additional funds to sufficiently upgrade these other systems in a timely manner. The Air Force and the Department as a whole are already starting to pay this price. For instance:

The Air Force retired its F–111 airplanes with their electronic jamming capability in order to save money for the F–22; now we find that the military will not fly missions even with our stealthy aircraft, such as the B–2, without jammer protection and there is concern about a shortage of these critical assets;

The Air Force has greatly cut back on its "Red Flag" pilot training program using dedicated aggressor squadrons—a program widely regarded as a key to superior US pilot proficiency;

The Air Force relies on 1950s and 1960s-era aerial tankers, many of which urgently require re-engineering and other upgrades, yet no funding is requested.

One of their most critical intelligence assets—the U–2 plan—flies with outdated avionics, which the Air Force has no plan to upgrade due to budget constraints;

The Air Force has no bomber modernization plan—the best they can come up with is a plan to keep the B–52s flying until they are literally 80 years old;

To find more money for the F–22, the Air Force has forced at least a two year delay in our next generation satellite early warning system (SBIRS–High) for the detection of ballistic missile attack—a critical system to our national security;

The Air Force isn't able to find enough new recruits and it is losing veteran pilots to early retirement at an alarming rate with the shortage now topping over 1,100 pilots—in part due to poor facilities for Air Force personnel and their families;

The Air Force has had serious ongoing spare parts shortages and has increasing equipment maintenance backlogs;

The Air Force ran out of key precision guided cruise missiles—the CALCM—during the Kosovo campaign;

There are new technologies for our top of the line F–15 and F–16 aircraft that will add significantly to their effectiveness, like the "link–16" system that could and should be fielded now—but must wait due to funding considerations;

The Marine Corps is being forced to replace its worn out helicopters with the new V–22 tiltrotor at a much slower rate than is optimal from an operational perspective.

What is the Realistic Threat? In making its recommendation on

SAC LANGAUGE (Rpt. 106-53)

Contains no language.

Page 22, Operations and Maintenance, Navy

5850	Fleet Ballistic missile underexecution	−10,000
5950	Weapons Maintenance-Pioneer UAV	+5,000
5950	MK–45 Overhaul	+10,000

Page 54, Other Procurement, Army

JTT/CIBS–M (TIARA)	155	24,262	155	24,262	.....	.....
TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (TUAV)	.....	45,863	.....	45,863	.....	.....
JOINT STARS (ARMY) (TIARA)	12	82,176	12	82,176		

Page 76, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

E–8C (AP–CY)	.....	.....	.....	46,000	.....	+46,000
PREDATOR UAV	3	38,003	3	38,003	.....	.....

Page 77, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

OTHER AIRCRAFT	.....	20,204	.....	20,204	.....	.....
PREDATOR MODS	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
IER MODIFICATIONS						

Page 100, RDT&E, Army

WWMCCS/GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM	11,606	11,606	.....
TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	3,866	3,866	.....
AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,932	4,932	

Page 108, RDT&E, Navy

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS	2,064	2,064	.....
TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	69,742	.....
AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,958	8,958	+4,000

CAC LANGUAGE Rpt. (106-371)

Page 67-68, Title VIII, General Provisions

SEC. 8165. REVIEW OF LOW DENSITY, HIGH DEMAND ASSETS.

(a) REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.~~T~~he Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report assessing the requirements, plans, and resources needed to maintain, update, modernize, restore, and expand the Department of Defense fleet of specialized aircraft and related equipment commonly described as Low Density, High Demand Assets.' The report shall be submitted no later than May 15, 2000 and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions.

(b) ASSETS TO BE COVERED.~~T~~he report shall cover the following aircraft and equipment:

(1) Electronic warfare aircraft and specialized jamming equipment.

(2) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and major systems, including—

(B) AWACS aircraft;

(C) JSTARS aircraft;

(D) RIVET JOINT aircraft;

(E) tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);

(F) interoperable/secure communications;

(G) command and control systems;

(H) new data links; and

(I) data fusion capability.

(3) Strategic and tactical airlift aircraft.

(4) Aerial refueling aircraft.

(5) Strategic bomber aircraft.

(c) REPORT ELEMENTS.~~T~~he report shall include for each asset specified in subsection (b) the following:

(A) inventory, age, capabilities, current deficiencies, usage rates, current and remaining service life, and expected rates of fatigue;

(B) ability to provide logistical support;

(C) planned replacement dates; and

(D) number of sorties, percentage of inventory used, and overall effectiveness in Operation Desert Fox and in Operation Allied Force.

(2) A comparison of the Department's plans and resource requirements to update, replace, modernize, or restore the asset as contained in the Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal year 2000 with those plans and resource requirements for that asset as contained in the Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal year 2001, and an explanation for any significant difference in those plans and requirements.

(3) A detailed listing, by fiscal year, of—

(A) the total amount required to fulfill mission needs statements and documented inventory objectives for the asset in order to improve critical warfighting capabilities over the next 10 years; and

B) of that total amount for each such year, the portion (stated as an amount and as a percentage) that is not included in the fiscal year 2001 Future Years Defense Plan.

Page 188, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

E-8C INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT	---	---	---	--	25,600
PREDATOR UAV	38,003	58,003	38,003	3	58,003

Page 190, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

PREDATOR UAV	38,003	58,003	38,003	58,003
Additional air vehicles and other support	.....	20,000	.....	20,000

Page 209, RDT&E, Army

TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	3,866	43,866	3,866	43,866
END ITEM INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES	66,167	102,667	80,167	100,667

Page 218, RDT&E, Navy

TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	77,242	69,742	75,742
AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,958	18,958	8,958	18,958

Page 223, RDT&E, Navy

Shortstop	.....	4,000	0	3,000
TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	69,742	77,242	69,742	75,742
Multifunction self-aligned gate	.....	4,500	0	3,000
Tactical control system—UAV	.....	3,000	0	3,000
System integration lab	.....	4,500	0	0
Tactical control system—program office	.....	−4,500	0	0
AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS	4,958	18,958	8,958	18,958