

COMMITTEE LANGUAGE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

**EA-6 SERIES
ACCOUNT: APN**

PRESBUD	HASC	SASC	CASC	HAC	SAC	CAC
161,047	206,047	186,047	186,047	272,047	201,047	240,047

HASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-162)

Page 65. Aircraft Procurement, Navy

MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT					
022	EA-6 SERIES	-	161,047	45,000	206,047
000	EA-6 SERIES		00,000		00,000

The Committee Bill: Managing Risk The committee's recommendations in the bill have been shaped by the above concerns and guided in large part by the priorities identified by the military service chiefs. The committee's first step is to put the defense budget on somewhat sounder fiscal footing. Thus, the committee bill increases the President's budget request by \$8.3 billion. Within this topline increase, the committee has taken a number of steps to improve the quality of military life, to improve the readiness of the force, and to accelerate the pace of equipment modernization. Major quality of life initiatives include a 4.8 percent basic military pay raise, substantial pay table reform, and reform of the military retirement system. The committee also rejected the Administration's inexplicable \$3.1 billion cut to the already underfunded military construction accounts, instead fully funding military construction at a level of \$8.6 billion to provide important improvements to the quality of military life. The committee also increased spending on critical readiness accounts by more than \$2 billion, including significant increases for real property maintenance and base operations support, depot maintenance, aircraft spare parts, combat training center operations, as well as more than \$700 million for other unfunded readiness priorities identified by the military service chiefs. The committee has also increased funding for equipment modernization, adding approximately \$4 billion to the President's underfunded budget request for research, development, and procurement programs. Important modernization initiatives include the addition of more than \$400 million to the Administration's request for missile defense programs, and substantial increases to upgrade the B2 bomber fleet, and for EA6B, F45, F-16, Joint Strike Fighter, V22, AH64 Apache Longbow and Co-manche helicopter programs. Despite the substantial improvements this bill has made to the President's budget request, the committee is under no illusions concerning the rising level of risk U.S. armed forces are facing. The committee does not believe that high risk in executing the core missions of our National Military Strategy is acceptable. The nation is facing a dilemma that Secretary Cohen recently articulated in testimony to the Congress. The Secretary noted the multiple strains caused by conducting Operation Allied Force simultaneously with having to meet other important requirements, and commented that we've got to find a way to either increase the size of our forces or decrease the number of our missions. The committee believes that unless the nation fields the forces and provides the resources required by the National Military Strategy, the inevitable alternative is for the United States to retreat from its global responsibilities and interests. As it does with regard to the growing risk confronting our military forces, the committee also believes it is unacceptable for the United States to retreat from the aggressive promotion and protection of our interests around the world.

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AUTHORIZATION

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

OVERVIEW

The President's \$53.0 billion procurement budget request for fiscal year 2000 represents a decrease of \$1.1 billion below the amount forecast in fiscal year 1999, \$9.3 billion below the amount first forecast in fiscal year 1996, and continues the Department of Defense's delay in achieving the Joint Chiefs of Staff goal of a \$60.0 billion procurement budget by three years (from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2001). Even before the initiation of Operation Allied Force the service chiefs of staff were lamenting a budget that leaves them far short of attaining their modernization requirements, despite Congress' having added over \$15.0 billion to the procurement accounts in the past four years. The ongoing campaign in the Balkans has only exacerbated this situation. For example, the Army Chief of Staff testified to the committee that modernization is still underfunded. What I don't think will be fixed out of this [referring to the funding he expects to receive in fiscal year 2000] will be the modernization. We'll have to defer that . . . further.' Commenting on his inability to recapitalize the fleets of naval ships and aircraft, the Chief of Naval Operations noted, 'We continue to compensate [for readiness and personnel needs] by shifting resources from modernization and recapitalization accounts to operations and support accounts.' Even more critical of the current predicament, he was the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who testified that, 'As I've said for years [our problem] is long term procurement. I have got very great concerns about the cancer of modernization that I must address.' And the Air Force Chief of Staff declared that 'If we don't modernize by replacing aircraft that are beyond their useful life and revitalize those with life left in them, we can expect significant additional maintenance requirements, reduced reliability, and increased costs as these aircraft deteriorate.' In order to bring the modernization problem into focus, the committee held a hearing on the Department's fleet of aging equipment. The Department clearly acknowledged that reduced modernization budgets, combined with increased deployments, have taken their toll. Its inventory of weapons is not only aging chronologically but also technologically, as older and overworked weapons systems continue to drain resources because of more frequent and more expensive maintenance. Equipment expected to leave the inventory years ago is still operational and, in some cases, approaching nearly double expected service lives. Yet, despite this situation, the procurement budget continues to receive low priority. Although much has been touted by the Department concerning a major increase in its budget in the next six fiscal years, the procurement accounts are not the beneficiaries of any largesse. As noted above, the fiscal year 2000 procurement request actually declines from the amount forecast only one year ago. The cumulative addition to these accounts over the next four years is projected to be only \$4.1 billion hardly a significant part of a proposed six year \$84.0 billion overall increase. Unfortunately, unless a sustained increase in procurement funding is forthcoming, the aging equipment situation will only get worse, as the impact of Operation Allied Force is felt. With the United States shouldering the largest share of the burden in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's air campaign against Yugoslavia, inventories of key precision weapons are being depleted at much faster rates than ever anticipated; units deployed for combat are stripping vital supplies from U.S. based units, contributing to a dramatic drop in their readiness ratings; and cannibalization rates are climbing rapidly within deployed units because of spare parts shortages. Even with the substantial amount of additional funding provided by the Congress in fiscal year 1999 supplemental appropriations, the process of 'getting well' from this ongoing operation will be slow and likely require substantial additional funding in the future. Against this backdrop, the committee successfully argued for an increase to the funds allocated for national defense in the fiscal year 2000 budget resolution and has applied much of this additional money to procurement. This marks the fifth consecutive year the committee has added funds to modernize the Department's weaponry, including:

[In millions of dollars]

Army:	
UH-60L helicopters	27.0
CH-47F upgrades	56.0
AH-64D upgrades	45.0
MLRS rocket launchers	56.0
Bradley fighting vehicles upgrades	72.0
M113A3 carrier mods	25.0
Small arms	48.0
Ammunition	55.0
Night vision devices	33.0
Shortstop	40.0
Communications equipment	92.0
Combat support equipment	63.0
Construction equipment	33.0
Navy/Marine Corps:	
KC-130J	252.0
MV-22	60.0
CH-60S	38.0
UC-35	18.0
E/A-6B upgrades	45.0
F/A-18 series modifications	63.0
P-3 series modifications	75.0
Tomahawk missiles	300.0
Joint stand-off weapon	75.0
Hellfire missiles	52.0
Joint direct attack munition	48.0
Maritime prepositioning ship-advance procurement	80.0
Base telecommunications upgrades	50.0
Improve & recovery vehicle	49.0
AH-1/UH-1 upgrades	27.0

Ammunition	75.0
Air Force:	
E-8C-advance procurement	46.0
B-2 upgrades	187.0
F-15 upgrades	50.0
F-16 upgrades	47.0
C-135 upgrades	68.0
Defense airborne reconnaissance program	40.0
Joint stand-off weapon	35.0
Minuteman III upgrades	40.0
AGM-65D Maverick upgrades	10.0
Joint direct attack munition	66.0
Ammunition	75.0
Theater deployable communications	35.0
Defense-Wide:	
National guard/reserve miscellaneous equipment	60.0

Page 69 – Procurement – Items of Special Interest

EA6B modifications The budget request contained \$161.0 million for EA6B modifications, but included no funds for the band 9/10 transmitter/receiver upgrade. The band 9/10 transmitter/receiver upgrade is designed to counter the high-frequency radar techniques of a new family of electronic threats. In recognition of this emerging requirement, the committee recommended an increase of \$39.0 million for fiscal year 1999 and the Congress appropriated \$20.0 million for this purpose. Additionally, the committee notes that the Department has an in-ventory objective of 196 band 9/10 transmitter/receiver systems but currently plans to procure only 120. The committee understands that the existing band 9 transmitter is based on 1960s technology and that the cost to maintain these systems through 2015 is approximately \$25.0 million. Consistent with its previous actions, the committee recommends \$206.0 million, an increase of \$45.0 million to procure additional band 9/10 transmitter/receivers for the EA6B.

Analysis of alternatives for follow-on support jammer

The budget request contained \$87.3 million in PE 64270N for engineering and manufacturing development of the EA6B electronic countermeasures aircraft system. The budget request states that a requirement exists to begin planning and analysis of alternatives for a command and control warfare (C2W) replacement for the EA-6B aircraft, however, no funds were requested for this purpose. The committee notes the high demands that are being placed on the EA6B aircraft as an electronic countermeasures weapons system, projections that there will not be enough EA6B aircraft to meet mission requirements beyond 2015, and considerations to re-tire the EA6B in 2015. The committee notes further that a mission needs statement for a C2W platform that would replace the EA6B and achieve initial operational capability in 2012 is being reviewed by the Navy. The committee understands that a C2W follow-on platform would incorporate air vehicle enhancements that would reduce operational and maintenance costs, improve reliability, and significantly increase command, control, and operational effectiveness. The committee believes that the Navy should initiate an analysis of alternatives for a C2W follow-on platform which will determine the most cost-effective approach for replacing the EA6B in the radar support jamming mission. The committee recommends an increase of \$5.0 million in PE 63XXXN to initiate the analysis of alternatives for a C2W replacement for the EA6B aircraft, and directs the establishment of a separate concept exploration/product definition and risk reduction program element for the program.

SASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-50)

Page 62, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

22	EA-6 SERIES	-	161,047	-	25,000	-	186,047
23	EA-6 SERIES	-	30,136	-		-	30,136

Page 91; Aircraft Procurement, Navy

EA-6B support jamming upgrade

The budget request included \$161.0 million for modifications to the EA6B Prowler airborne electronic warfare aircraft, with \$32.4 million allocated for the ALQ99 pods, to include the modified Band 9/10 transmitters. These modified transmitters provide the EA6B with the ability to counter threat radar electronic protection techniques installed in a widely exported threat systems in the Band 7/8 frequency range. The committee recommends an increase of \$25.0 million to accelerate the acquisition of modified Band 9/10 transmitters, a total authorization of \$186.0 million.

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense may be overly optimistic in its estimate that the EA6B Prowler will remain in service until fiscal year 2015. The integration of electronic combat has become a basic tenet of the way power projection and interdiction forces operate. A solid roadmap for maintaining this capability is essential. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to deliver a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2000, that outlines a notional schedule for analysis, demonstration, development, and production of a follow-on support jammer.

Page 480 and 481; Additional Views Of Senator John McCain on the National Defense Authorization Bill For Fiscal Year 2000

The Armed Services Committee has voted out unanimously a bill worthy of the Senate's support. Building upon recommendations and discoveries regarding growing readiness and modernization problems throughout the services, the Committee has done an admirable job of addressing many of the more pressing issues contributing to the myriad of problems that have been brought to its attention over the past year. The President's budget request failed again to provide adequate funding to meet the minimum requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fund critical readiness, personnel and modernization programs. Particularly disturbing is the degree to which the budget re-quest ignored clear and convincing evidence that there are serious readiness, retention and recruiting problems throughout the military. The Service Chiefs testified before the Armed Services Committee in September last year, and again in January, that they re-quire an additional \$20 billion in fiscal year 2000 above the amount included in the current year's budget to reverse negative trends in force readiness. During posture hearings, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs confirmed that readiness unfunded requirements still exist and submitted lists to meet their readiness requirements. The defense budget had been in steady decline in real terms since 1986. While that decline has finally subsided, the pace at which forces are operating, combined with a still seriously con-strained resource environment, has served to exacerbate the negative impact of that decade of inadequate attention to national defense. Moreover, the Administration's promise of a \$12.6 billion in-crease in the FY2000 budget represents considerably less of an in-crease than meets the eye. In fact, only \$4.1 billion of that increase represents credible budget authority. The remaining \$8.5 billion of the so-called increase comes from smoke and mirrors'gimmickry like anticipated lower inflation and fuel costs, cuts in previously funded programs, and an incremental funding plan for military construction projects. The nuclear carrier USS ENTERPRISE (CVN65) was recently deployed in the Persian Gulf, undermanned by some 800 sailors. We are losing pilots to the commercial airlines faster than we can train them. The Navy has one-half the F/A18 pilots, one-third of the S3 pilots, and only one-quarter of the EA6B pilots it needs. Only 26 percent of the Air Force pilots have committed to stay beyond their current service agreement. The Army states that five of its 10 divisions lack enough majors, captains, senior enlisted

personnel, tankers and gunners. Over 60 percent of Naval Special Warfare officers are leaving the service. It is imperative that the President work diligently to address these problems and begin to fund the military at a level commensurate with ever-increasing operational requirements.

CASC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-301)

Page 524, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

22	EA-6 SERIES	-	161,047	-	206,047	-	186,047	-	25,000	-	186,047
23	AV-8 SERIES	-	39,126	-	39,126	-	39,126	-	-	-	39,126

Page 526, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

E6B modifications

The budget request included \$161.0 million for various modifications to the EA6B aircraft.

The Senate bill would authorize an increase of \$25.0 million for the procurement of additional modified band 9/10 transmitters.

The House amendment would authorize an increase of \$45.0 million for the procurement of additional band 9/10 transmitters.

The conferees agree to authorize an increase of \$25.0 million for the procurement of additional band 9/10 transmitters.

HAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-244)

Page 142, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT					7,004,000
EA-6 Series		161,047		272,047	+111,000
Night vision devices					+31,000
Simulators					+60,000
Refurbish test aircraft to operational configuration					+20,000
EA-6B Series		200,700		201,700	27,000

Page 148, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT					
EA-6 SERIES		--	161,047	--	272,047
AV-8 SERIES		--	39,126	--	39,126

Page 225, RDT&E, Navy

EW Development	163,077	237,577	+74,500
Location of GPS system jammers			+4,500
EA-6B connectivity (link 16)			+60,000
Integrated defensive electronic countermeasures			+10,000

Page 226, RDT&E, Navy

F/A-18 Squadrons	315,714	373,214	+57,500
LAU-138A/A BOL chaff countermeasures			+2,500
EA-6B follow-on support jammer, F/A-18E/F variant			+40,000
Radar ECCM improvements			+15,000

Page 13, Shortages of Low-Density, High-Demand Assets

SHORTAGES OF LOW-DENSITY, HIGH-DEMAND ASSETS

The Committee is especially troubled as many of these deficiencies, including shortages in so-called low-density, high-demand assets, have been well known for some time. These include, but are not limited to: electronic warfare aircraft and specialized jamming equipment; tactical intelligence collection and dissemination assets (ranging from collection assets such as the U2, RIVET JOINT, AWACS and JSTARS aircraft and tactical UAVs; inter-operable, secure communications and command and control, to include new data links and data fusion capability); and tactical air-lift, aerial refueling capability and other transportation and logistics support platforms and equipment. The Committee has consistently supported additions over DoD budget requests for such programs over the years. Nevertheless, continued shortages in these and many other categories clearly posed operational constraints during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force. This not only impeded the regional commands charged with prosecuting the air campaigns, but also other regional commanders who were confronted with the physical diversion of assets from their areas of responsibility and other unexpected resource shortfalls.

The Committee's concern about these problems is not new, and it has demonstrated it will not shy from taking actions to ensure that our forces in the field are not at risk or caught short. In this regard, the recently-enacted emergency supplemental appropriations act which provided funding for the conduct of Operation Allied Force (Public Law 10631) created a new appropriations account, the Operational Rapid Response Transfer Fund, that was expressly intended to provide a funding source to meet immediate shortfalls and needs identified by the regional CINCs. The Committee understands the Department will soon make use of the \$300,000,000 provided by the Congress in this fund to address some of these most urgent problems, such as those plaguing the limited inventory of Navy EA6B jamming aircraft.

The Committee

commends the senior leadership of the Department for expeditiously following through on the Congress' intent in this regard.

However, it is clear much more must be done. As with the questions raised earlier in this report about the proper size and organization of each of the military services, a continued failure by the DoD generally and the military services and defense agencies specifically to consistently link operational needs to decisions about resource allocations and defense program development carries with it serious implications for the ability of the U.S. military to carry out the current national security strategy. This is not just a theoretical discussion, nor one which the Committee believes can be deferred.

The Committee bill, across all services and defense agencies, is intended to bring these questions to the forefront and in the instance of one of the military services the United States Air Force the Committee believes these problems are now so acute that it must take a series of immediate and forceful steps.

Pages 19 and 20, Potential Alternatives

The Committee also examined potential alternatives to the current F22 program, and makes the following findings.

The Air Force has justified the need for the F22 in part as a replacement for aging F45 aircraft. However, service life data from the Air Force indicates that the F45 can exceed 16,000 flying hours without major structural changes. The average age of the F45 inventory is expected to be only 8000 flying hours by 2015.

F45 can be improved to provide greatly enhanced combat capability.—

F45 combat capabilities can be improved substantially with upgraded radars, jammers, and helmet mounted targeting systems. The most cost effective upgrade may be a new datalink which allows aircraft to share target information. Air Force testimony to the Committee this year described the so-called Link 16 datalink as the most significant increase in fighter avionics since the introduction of the on-board radar. Tests with this \$200,000 per aircraft

upgrade to the F45 have demonstrated a five-fold increase in air combat kill ratios. (The Committee fails to understand why the Air Force has neglected to budget for this modestly priced upgrade for all its combat coded F45s, while it chooses to request \$150 million in fiscal year 2000 to redesign F22 parts that have already become obsolete. The Committee notes that while this upgrade makes the F45 five times more effective in the air combat mission, the

JSF has robust air-to-air capabilities and will be available in fiscal year 2007. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), in development to produce a lower cost, yet highly capable replacement for Navy F/A18s, Marine Corps F/A18s and AV8Bs, and Air Force F16s is scheduled to begin production deliveries in 2007. This program will be badly needed in this timeframe to begin replacing these aircraft types, which comprise the vast majority of the U.S. tactical fighter force, as their age and usage rates make a replacement in this timeframe essential, While incorporating advanced technology similar to that being developed for the F22, the much higher inventory objective (over 2,800 aircraft) plus the lack of any other alternatives at present to deal with the block obsolescence issue make the JSF, in the Committee's view, one of the DoD's highest acquisition priorities.

Like the F22, the Joint Strike Fighter combines stealth and advanced avionics to provide a robust air-to-air capability. Unlike the F22, the JSF is being designed to be an affordable joint aircraft with far superior air-to-ground capabilities.

U.S. has other advantages in the area of air dominance. While not minimizing the potential advantages which accrue to the side with a high technology air superiority aircraft, the Committee believes that the achievement of air dominance in the information age is more than one-on-one dogfights. Eight years ago, during Operation

Desert Storm, 200 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed or captured on the ground whereas only 35 were destroyed in air-to-air combat. Since then, the U.S. has immensely improved its ability to achieve battlefield information dominance and to prosecute ground targets with precision guided weapons. The U.S. ability to damage run-ways, destroy aircraft fuel and repair infrastructure, and disrupt enemy command and control is improving markedly with the continued introduction of precision stand-off weapons into the bomber and tactical fighter inventory. This will severely limit any adversary's ability to get fighters airborne to mount serious challenges to U.S. fighters.

Should enemy fighters get airborne, absent a complete change in U.S. training and readiness priorities, they will likely confront a U.S. force possessing large numbers of highly maintained advanced fighters operated by better trained pilots with superior situational awareness. Despite current inventory problems (due largely to limited numbers of the total number of specialized platforms), there is no question the United States enjoys tremendous advantages in surveillance (AWACS, JSTARS), jamming (EA6B, EC130), command, control and communications, intelligence (RC135s, EP3s, UAVs, satellites), tactics, training, maintenance, and long-range precision weapons. It is vitally important that sufficient resources be invested in these systems as well something the Committee believes is not being done.

Page 24, Mission Essential Shortfalls

Mission Essential Shortfalls.—The Committee has included additional funding for less glamorous, yet mission essential items which are critical for the capabilities of deployed troops. The Committee recommends increases over the budget request for such items as: tactical radios (\$40,000,000), afloat protection systems (\$24,400,000), enhancements to the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft fleet (\$111,000,000), ammunition for all services (\$202,954,000), communication and electronics infrastructure equipment (\$135,200,000) and tracked vehicle modification kits (\$60,500,000).

Page 81, Operations and Maintenance

The adjustments to the budget activities for Operation and Maintenance, Navy are shown below:

(In thousands of dollars)

Budget Activity 1: Operating Forces:	
4400 Flying Hours (Marine Aviation Logistics CH-46/7-58)	27,400
4400 UAV Flight Hours	2,000
4450 Contractor Maintenance Support (Marine Corps Aviation)	3,100
4450 Rotational Training—Naval Air Strike Airwarfare Center	2,000
4600 Depot Maintenance—Aircraft and Support Equipment Rework	37,600
4600 Depot Maintenance—EA-6B Depot Support (Marine Corps Aviation)	2,500
4600 Depot Maintenance—EA-6B Pod Repair (Marine Corps Aviation)	1,000
5200 Depot Maintenance—Shipboard Maintenance	22,000

EA-6B AIRCRAFT

With the retirement of the Air Force EF-111 aircraft, the EA-6B has become the Defense Department's primary escort jammer aircraft to support combat strike missions. The crews and aircraft of Navy and Marine EA-6B squadrons performed admirably during Operation Allied Force. However, due to the Department's overall lack of jamming aircraft, the forces were stretched, air crews were stressed, and the logistics support tail was strained. This operation also made it clear that even advanced stealth aircraft benefit from escort jamming from the EA-6B, counter to assumptions made when the EF-111s were retired.

The Committee views recent EA-6B operations be it in Operation Allied Force, or in the ongoing sanctions enforcement operations around Iraq, as a premier example of the actual and potential future benefits of joint service combat operations. The Committee believes this clearly indicates that more, not less, tactical escort jamming support, will be needed in the future. Yet the EA-6B airframe has limited life remaining and its limited numbers have already posed severe challenges to operational planners. Therefore, the Committee bill recommends an additional \$227,000,000 to reinvigorate the tactical jamming aircraft force.

The fiscal year 1999 Supplemental Appropriations Act financing the cost of Operation Allied Force provided \$300,000,000 for an operational rapid response fund. The Defense Department has indicated that a number of EA-6B near-term upgrades will be financed

from the supplemental funds, to include: \$45,000,000 for band 9/10 jammers, \$39,000,000 for universal exciters, and \$30,400,000 for miniaturized automated tactical terminals/integrated data modems. Although these items provide important and quick warfighting improvements to the EA-6B fleet (a use for the fund consistent with its creation by this Committee), they do not address the mid and long term fleet force structure and modernization issues.

Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional \$111,000,000 in Aircraft Procurement, Navy for EA-6B enhancements. This includes \$60,000,000 for the procurement of high-fidelity simulators for EA-6B bases at Cherry Point, North Carolina and Whidbey Island, Washington; \$31,000,000 to procure and install EA-6B night vision equipment; and \$20,000,000 to remanufacture a test aircraft into an operational asset. The rationale for these additions as follows. After the budget was submitted, the Navy informed the Committee that competitively procuring high fidelity simulators for east and west coast EA-6B bases was feasible and would result in reduced need for aircraft flight training hours, more airframes for forward deployment, and reduced airframe wear. Outfitting the EA-6Bs with night vision devices increases operational effectiveness while reducing crew risk to enemy optically guided surface-to-air missiles. Finally, refurbishment of an EA-6B test asset will result in one additional combat aircraft deployed to the fleet.

The EA-6B force structure, already heavily tasked to meet current commitments, will decline over time due to aircraft wear and attrition and cannot be augmented with new production aircraft on a cost-effective basis. Moreover, in about ten years, the EA-6B fleet size and capabilities will begin a steady decline as older aircraft reach the age of retirement. The Defense Department currently has no plan to meet these eventualities, and therefore, the Committee believes it would be prudent to begin planning now to ensure that no EA-6B force degradation occurs. Elsewhere in this report, the Committee recommends an additional \$116,000,000 in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy account for tactical jamming aircraft enhancements. This includes \$60,000,000 to provide the EA-6B with Link 16 connectivity; \$16,000,000 to initiate an analysis of alternatives for a follow-on jammer aircraft; and \$40,000,000 to immediately begin risk reduction and concept development for a F/A-18E/F variant to become the follow-on tactical jamming aircraft. The Committee urges the Defense Department to expand the tactical jammer aircraft fleet, in particular to capitalize upon the operational need and advantages which accrue from combining jamming with stealth aircraft, by introducing a tactical jamming variant of the F/A-18E/F aircraft by the year 2006.

SAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-53)

Contains no language.

Page 61, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT:			
EA-6 SERIES	161,047	201,047	+ 40,000
AV-8 SERIES	39,126	39,126	

Page 62, Aircraft Procurement, Navy

EA-6 SERIES	161,047	201,047	+ 40,000
EA-6B Band 9/10 Transmitters		25,000	+ 25,000
Night vision devices		15,000	+ 15,000
EA-6B SERIES	39,126	39,126	

CAC LANGUAGE (Rpt. 106-371)

Page 54-56, Title VIII, General Provisions

SEC. 8125. (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than January 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees in both classified and unclassified form a report on the conduct of Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force (also referred to as Operation Noble Anvil). The Secretary of Defense shall submit to such committees a preliminary report on the conduct of these operations not later than December 15, 1999. The report (including the preliminary report) should be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command, and the Commander in Chief of the United States European Command.

(b) REVIEW OF SUCCESSES AND DEFICIENCIES.—The report should contain a thorough review of the successes and deficiencies of these operations, with respect to the following matters:

- (1) United States military objectives in these operations.*

(2) *With respect to Operation Allied Force, the military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to obtain said military objectives.*

(3) *The command structure for the execution of Operation Allied Force.*

(4) *The process for identifying, nominating, selecting, and verifying targets to be attacked during Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force.*

(5) *A comprehensive battle damage assessment of targets prosecuted during the conduct of the air campaigns in these operations, to include—*

(A) fixed targets, both military and civilian, to include bridges, roads, rail lines, airfields, power generating plants, broadcast facilities, oil refining infrastructure, fuel and munitions storage installations, industrial plants producing military equipment, command and control nodes, civilian leadership bunkers and military barracks;

(B) mobile military targets such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, trucks, and air defense assets;

(C) with respect to Operation Desert Fox, research and production facilities associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and any military units or organizations associated with such activities within Iraq; and

(D) a discussion of decoy, deception and counter-intelligence techniques employed by the Iraqi and Serbian military.

(6) *The use and performance of United States military equipment, weapon systems, munitions, and national and tactical reconnaissance and surveillance assets (including items classified under special access procedures) and an analysis of—*

(A) any equipment or capabilities that were in research and development and if available could have been used in these operations' respective theater of operations;

(B) any equipment or capabilities that were available and could have been used but were not introduced into these operations' respective theater of operations; and

(C) any equipment or capabilities that were introduced to these operations' respective theater of operations that could have been used but were not.

(7) *Command, control, communications and operational security of NATO forces as a whole and United States forces separately during Operation Allied Force, including the ability of United States aircraft to operate with aircraft of other nations without degradation of capabilities or protection of United States forces.*

(8) *The deployment of United States forces and supplies to the theater of operations, including an assessment of airlift and sealift (to include a specific assessment of the deployment of Task Force Hawk during Operation Allied Force, to include detailed explanations for the delay in initial deployment, the suitability of equipment deployed compared to other equipment in*

training provided to operational personnel prior to and during the deployment).

(9) The use of electronic warfare assets, in particular an assessment of the adequacy of EA-6B aircraft in terms of inventory, capabilities, deficiencies, and ability to provide logistics support.

Page 121, Operation and Maintenance, Navy

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY

The conference agreement on items addressed by either the House or the Senate is as follows:

(In thousands of dollars)

	Budget	House	Senate	Conference
4250 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY				
4300 BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATING FORCES				
4350 AIR OPERATIONS				
4400 MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS.....	2,232,508	2,261,908	2,232,508	2,254,508
4450 FLEET AIR TRAINING.....	693,133	698,233	693,133	696,633
4500 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE.....	48,792	48,792	48,792	48,792
4550 AIR OPERATIONS AND SAFETY SUPPORT.....	91,823	91,823	91,823	91,823
4600 AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE.....	746,924	788,024	746,924	773,124

Page 125, Operation and Maintenance, Navy

ADJUSTMENTS TO BUDGET ACTIVITIES

Adjustments to the budget activities are as follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

Budget Activity 1: Operating Forces:	
4400 Flying Hours (Marine Aviation Logistics CH-46/T-58)	20,000
4400 UAV Flight Hours	2,000
4450 Contractor Maintenance Support (Marine Corps Aviation)	1,500
4450 Rotational Training—Naval Air Strike Airwarfare Center	2,000
4600 Depot Maintenance—Aircraft and Support Equipment Rework	24,000
4600 Depot Maintenance—EA-6B Depot Support (Marine Corps Aviation)	1,600
4600 Depot Maintenance—EA-6B Pod Repair (Marine Corps Aviation)	600

EA-6 SERIES	161,047	272,047	201,047	--	240,047
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EXPLANATION OF PROJECT LEVEL ADJUSTMENTS
[In thousands of dollars]

	Budget	House	Senate	Conference
EA-6 SERIES	161,047	272,047	201,047	240,047
Modified Band 9/10 (7/8) jammers		0	25,000	18,000
Night vision devices		31,000	15,000	31,000
Simulators		60,000	0	30,000
Refurbish test aircraft to operational configuration		20,000	0	0

C2W REPLACEMENT FOR EA-6B	0	16,000	0	0
Analysis of alternatives		16,000	0	0
Note: Funded in RDT&E, Defensewide				

EW DEVELOPMENT	163,077	237,577	163,077	209,077
Location of GPS system jammers		4,500	0	4,000
EA-6B connectivity (link 16)		60,000	0	30,000
Integrated defensive integrated electronic countermeasures		10,000	0	7,000
ICAP III spray cooling technology				5,000

F/A-18 SQUADRONS	315,714	373,214	320,714	322,714
LAU-138A/A BOL chaff countermeasures		2,500	0	2,000
Joint helmet mounted cueing system		0	5,000	0
EA-6B follow-on support jammer, F/A-18E/F variant		40,000	0	0
Radar ECCM improvements		15,000	0	5,000